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Towards a metaphysics of the soul and a participatory aesthetics of life:  
mobilising Foucault, affect and animism for caring practices of existence  
 
Sian Sullivan 
 
 
… and here we come back again to that forgotten, outcast word, the soul.1  
 
Introduction: on the severing of soul from life-beyond-the-human 
It has become common to locate an origin myth for contemporary environmental problems in 
the conceptual severing of mind from body, and culture from nature, characterising the 
reclamation of classical thought that precipitated the European Enlightenment.2 Part and 
parcel of this mode of thought was a rigorous removal of soul from beyond-human life.3 
Cartesian ontology stripped living creatures of the presence of soul so as to make humans 
exceptional in these terms, creating pacified objects and automata of beyond-human others.4 
This is an ontological move that is both a way of knowing and of making the world, in the 
sense that animals and other entities that become conceived as soulless objects are thereby 
also treated and performed as such.5 Extending the hierarchies of soul distilled by Plato and 
then Aristotle,6 Descartes extracted soul from beyond-human entities,7 such that life became 
effectively lifeless: conceived and thereby enacted as passive and predictably machine-like, 
yet also morally in need of correction and subjugation.8 Variously dispossessed of the 
capacities of movement, perception, communication and self-directed telos, and thus usefully 
backgrounded as existing only for the instrumental ends of humans, beyond-human life 
became stilled and desacralised as the objects of human art and in(ter)vention.9  
 
Somewhat paradoxically, much rhetoric and practice in contemporary environmental 
conservation reproduces this pacifying, objectifying, and ultimately mechanising orientation. 
Notwithstanding designations of ‘wildness’ and ‘rewilding’ as space-making strategies for the 
immanent and self-willed liveliness of diverse beyond-human natures,10 the sequestration of 
conserved, viewed and hunted ‘wild natures’ can reproduce rather than refract the relational 
and affective alienations between human and other-than-human natures associated with the 
modern era.11 Indeed, new conservation technologies such as biodiversity offsetting12 have 
invigorated mechanistic approaches to natures-beyond-the-human in recent years. In 
biodiversity offsetting technologies, the relational field of nature becomes disaggregated into 
discrete units whose subtraction and addition can seemingly engender improvements in an 
‘aggregate bottom line’ (termed ‘net gain’ or ‘no let loss’ of biodiversity), even though losses 
through development-associated transformations have occurred.13  
 
The severing of soul from a machine-like nature and the dominance over embodied life this 
severance makes possible is, however, only one variety of past thinking and practices that 
may inform present relationships with natures-beyond-the human. In this essay I extend prior 
engagement that mobilises the work of philosopher Michel Foucault to offer clarity regarding 
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the neoliberal ‘arts of government’ structuring much recent and current environmental 
conservation work.14 I draw on later works by Foucault which encourage, in perhaps 
surprising ways, creative reconsiderations of ways of attending to self and other through both 
an expanded consideration of ‘soul’ (psūkhe15) and an encouragement to tend to ‘the self’ so 
as ultimately to also attend well to others and to ‘life itself’ (bios). The latter dimension is, of 
course, clearly relevant to the goals of contemporary biodiversity conservation. In the 
extraordinarily generous meditation on the nature and practice of truth that constitutes 
Foucault’s final lecture series delivered in 1983-1984,16 Foucault extends his earlier work on 
the care of the self,17 to ultimately frame care of the self as both care of the soul and care of 
bios – of embodied life. Such a focus seems critically relevant for societal understandings of 
practices that engender the care – epimeleia – for beyond-human others that constitutes a core 
concern of environmental conservation and care.18 Instead, an intensification of fragmented 
selves, overwhelm, addiction, self-blame, self-harm and narcissism characterises the 
contemporary moment,19 linking the atomising zeitgeist of neoliberalism with a contradictory 
lack of care of the self that extends into a brutal lack of care for human and beyond-human 
others.20 
 
I open the following commentary, then, by re-thinking the notion of ‘soul’ in considering an 
expanded exploration of care of the self. I then move to propose that a ‘bioecoethics’ that 
encourages care for others, including the multiplicitous others constituting life itself, is central 
to this expanded conception of care of the self. Both these moves – a (re-)emphasis on a 
metaphysics of soul in care of the self, and an explicit understanding that care of the self 
includes care for others as well as care for life itself – draw me (once again21) towards 
observations of the resonance between such ethical reflections and animist arts of conduct. 
Animist practices of existence emerge at least in part through an assumption of soul as the 
hypostatis of existence, and not limited therefore to exceptional humans.22 In combination 
with perceptions and experiences of distributed agency in beyond-human entities, diverse 
other-than-human natures thereby become folded into moral economies of representation, 
choice, action, sharing and predation that are not solely human.23 These perceptions and 
practices, and specifically the curtailment of appetites and accumulations they can effect, may 
emphasise affective and pragmatic modes of existence that constitute and work for an 
abundant and egalitarian ethics and aesthetics of life itself.  
 
Beyond these more general possibilities, the observations outlined above are relevant for 
pragmatic environmental, and specifically ‘biodiversity’, conservation endeavours for two 
additional reasons. First, because there is a correspondence between contemporary cultures 
that might loosely be described as animist and the territories of so-called ‘biodiversity 
hotspots’ globally.24 Secondly, because territorial threats to such cultures are associated at 
least in part with the establishment and policing of protected areas25. In my concluding 
section I thus draw attention to ‘the courage of truth’ currently needed in order to articulate 
and enact varied ‘animist socialist’ practices of existence and of caring, given the apparent 
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status of these practices as ‘falsehoods’ to be excluded in modern rationality and truth 
regimes.   
 
 
Re-thinking soul in extending care of the self 
 
So I turn myself to face me.26  
 
One of the keys of classical Greek thought seems to be an understanding of ‘soul’, i.e. psūkhe, 
as ontologically distinct from ‘the body’. As recovered in detail in various works by Michel 
Foucault,27 it is this soul that is able to contemplate the actions of the self, and thus to be 
mobilised or activated so as to foster practices of freedom, i.e. of will, that exercise labor on 
oneself in the form of care of the self. The implication is that the subject that turns round to 
the self and that attends to (i.e. cares for) oneself28 will ultimately also practice relations of 
power (i.e. arts of conduct) that tend towards freedom for all, because they practice freedom 
(in the mastery of appetites).29  
 
From a dialogue attributed to Plato between Socrates and a young man (Alcibiades) about to 
enter public life, Foucault summarises care of the self as ‘a mode of knowledge of self which 
had the form of the soul’s contemplation of itself and its recognition of its mode of being’.30 
Care of the self initially means ‘[t]urning one’s gaze on the self … [and] turning it away from 
others first of all. And then, later, it means turning it away from the things of the world’.31 
Indeed, ‘all is lost if you begin with care of others’ rather than of the self.32 In the precept and 
set of practices of care of the self in ancient philosophical and moral life: ‘the establishment 
of oneself as a reality ontologically distinct from the body, in the form of a psūkhe which 
possesses the possibility and ethical duty of contemplating itself, gives rise to a mode of truth-
telling, of veridiction, the role and end of which is to lead the soul back to its mode of being 
and its world’.33 Care for the self is additionally identified as ‘the principle that taking care of 
the soul is, for the soul, to contemplate itself and, in doing so, to re-cognise [i.e. connect with] 
the divine element which is precisely what enables it to see the truth’.34 For Socrates, ‘the soul 
must look at itself … it is like an eye which, seeking to see itself, is forced to look into the 
pupil of another eye in order to see [recollect] itself, [through which] by contemplating the 
divine reality, we can grasp what is divine in our own soul’.35  
 
For Socrates, then, the soul able to contemplate ‘itself’ is already both ‘relational’ and 
‘divine’. Indeed care of the self ‘calls for a number of operations by which the subject must 
purify himself [through arts of catharsis] and become, in his own nature, able to have contact 
with and to recognise the divine element within him’.36 Through the encouraged presence of a 
listening other, care of one’s soul was thereby conceived by the classical Greeks as imbricated 
with other selves so as to be(come) both polyvalent and dialogic rather than atomised and 
individualistic.37 Both knowing yourself (gnōthi seauton) and caring for yourself (epimeleia 
heautou) were placed at the centre of human community: ‘you must attend to yourself, you 
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must not forget yourself, you must take care of yourself’, as well as ‘encouraging others to 
attend to themselves’.38 
 
Let us pause for a moment on the possibility of seeing what is divine in an other, in order to 
get a grip on ‘what is divine in our own soul’. The notion of soul is variously associated with 
breath and brightness: with a relaxed inner light – ‘the light, which at the same time is the 
source of being’39 whose élan vital engenders ‘a feeling of participation in a flowing onward’ 
in the sonorous reverberations of existence.40 In ancient and classical times, the soul that 
flourished amplified eudaimonia overall. Associated with the goddess of happiness and 
prosperity, the term eudaimonia is comprised of words for ‘good’ or ‘harmony’ combined 
with ‘soul’. Embodying eudaimonia in the time of Socrates thus literally denoted living in 
such a way that (one’s) soul is nourished. A life lived well and harmoniously was thereby 
framed in terms of ‘a good of the soul – not a material or bodily good such as wealth or 
political power’.41 Eudaimonia remains a key term today in the philosophical domain of 
virtue ethics, i.e. the branch of philosophy inspired by the classical Greeks that considers what 
it means, and what is required, to live ‘a good life’42. Perhaps more familiarly, it appears in 
translation as the vegetal, generative term ‘flourishing’, a concept central to a number of 
recent texts concerned with possibilities for caring entanglements of human with other-than-
human lives.43  
 
This brief detour around conceptions of eudaimonia gestures towards ways in which 
Socrates’ encouragements to take care of the self through taking care of the soul (as invoked 
in Foucault’s later work) were themselves connected with a milieu of past conceptions, 
practices and usages. As Foucault writes, the ‘modes of valuation and generally accepted 
attitudes’ of the classical Greek situation were themselves ‘evidence of a rather widespread 
moral tradition, which was doubtless rather deeply rooted in the past’.44  
 
Two elements of these deep roots are worth mentioning here. One is the observation that the 
latter part of the term eudaimonia also referred to a prior and co-existing conception in the 
mythology of ancient Greece of ‘daemons’ as ‘benign supernatural beings’ associated 
simultaneously with beyond-human nature and ‘an individual’s personal spirit’45 or ‘soul’. To 
live well, i.e. to experience happiness as a result of living a harmonious life, was thus rooted 
in an older embrace of the communicative guidance of spirited agencies of nature. This 
(especially Pythagorean) embrace entailed an understanding that other kinds of being were 
also animated by a daemon (daimōn) or spirited soul, whose nourishment also made it 
possible for those beings to live well.46 ‘Flourishing’ in these older expressions of a 
multifaceted eudaimonia or harmonious soul thereby connects with an animistic conception 
and experience of soul as distributed through diverse manifestations of existence (discussed 
further below), inviting daily lived practices of empathic ‘co-participation’ to amplify 
possibilities for the co-sustenance of varied bodies and materialities.47 These beyond-human 
aspects have been almost completely written-out of later conceptions of eudaimonia as 
specifically human flourishing, although a resurgence of ‘the acknowledged virtues of 
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ecological dependence’ is also noticeable.48 A second ‘deep root’ links classical Greek 
practices associated with the soul contemplating itself so as to care for the self, with older 
established techniques of care including the interpretation of dreams as acts of and on the soul 
which is in connection with a world beyond the self.49 These conceptions and techniques are 
themselves embedded in a longstanding milieu of practices that might be termed ‘shamanic 
arts of the soul’,50 connected additionally with animist ontologies of being.51  
 
Returning to the resurgence of classical Greek thought, ethics and aesthetics that accompanied 
the European Enlightenment, the passions and practices of the soul again received great 
attention in this Cartesian moment.52 Descartes, however, seems to differ from the classical 
Greeks by attaching the locating the soul firmly to the human body (via the pineal gland), 
whilst also emphasising the possibility of actions of the will in attaining mastery over the 
soul’s ‘passions’.53 In combination with the shift towards the cogito – ‘I think therefore I am’ 
– a new impetus was ushered in through which ‘the condition for the subject’s access to the 
truth is knowledge (connaissance)’ that can be indefinitely accumulated via individualised 
trajectories and is relatively unmoored from earlier conceptions and practices of care.54 As 
Foucault puts it, this impetus then becomes a ‘modern elimination of care of the self in favour 
of self-knowledge’.55 Combined with the severing of soul from beyond-human life (as noted 
in the opening section), the cogito arguably plays a key role in sanctioning an individualistic 
mode of knowledge accumulation that exceeds and displaces the care for others effected 
through older practices of care of the self.  
 
Foucault claims further that in these older practices of care of the self ultimately ‘what is 
designated as the object one must take care of is not the soul, it is life (bios), that is to say the 
way of living’.56 This point seems to be of critical relevance in the contemporary moment. It 
leads Foucault to ask: ‘what in the way of ethics and rules of conduct follows from this 
ontological foundation of … being’ constituted by care of the self?57 I consider this question 
in the following section. 
 
 
Care for the self as bioecoethical practice 
In his lectures on biopolitics of 1978-1979, Foucault highlights the contemporary 
intensification of neoliberal arts of government by which economic incentive structures are 
designed to control human behaviour and ‘life itself’ through market transactions framed as 
enhancing efficiency in the distribution of goods and bads. For Foucault, ‘arts of government’ 
or ‘governmentality’ were not effected solely through top-down institutions and policies of 
government, but instead were generated through multiplicitous, dynamic and distributed 
technical work and discourses. This is the ‘conduct of conduct’ of heterogenous ‘discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, 
scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions’, that also 
sediments into particular and empowered institutional apparatuses or dispositifs.58 
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In a much-cited article in Conservation and Society drawing on Foucaultian understandings of 
neoliberal arts of governance Fletcher summarises neoliberalism as thoroughly imbricated in 
conservation policy and practice through:  
 
1) the creation of capitalist markets for natural resource exchange and 
consumption; 2) privatisation of resource control within these markets; 3) 
commodification of resources so that they can be traded within markets; 4) 
withdrawal of direct government intervention from market transactions [whilst 
maintaining continual vigilance in relation to the maintenance of market structures 
and conditions59]; and 5) decentralisation of resource governance to local 
authorities and non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs).60  
 
Neoliberal environmentality through conservation thus endeavours ‘to provide [market-based] 
incentives sufficient to motivate individuals to choose to behave in conservation-friendly 
ways’.61 The human subject of this ‘truth game of the market’, however, seems critically 
disempowered: conceived as an individualised machine-like agent that responds predictably 
to expert manipulations engendering a capitalist governmentality that paradoxically seems to 
deepen, rather than redress, the inequities and ecological damage with which it is associated. 
Indeed, Pignarre and Stengers describe this disempowering ‘hold’ by capitalism over the 
‘agents’ that loyally perform its depoliticised and naturalised fabrications as ‘sorcery’, 
arguing that to understand this hold ‘we must turn towards knowledges that have been 
disqualified’.62  
 
In the last works of his life, especially his lecture series The Hermeneutics of the Subject 
(1981-1982) and The Courage of Truth (1983-1984), Foucault turned again towards the 
possibility of seeking other rules of subjectification so as to play the games of power ‘with as 
little domination as possible’.63 His encouragement, as highlighted in the preceding section, is 
to remember the philosophical strategy associated with Socrates, namely to attend to oneself 
so as to care for oneself and, through this attention, to care for others and for life itself. By the 
means of this ‘continuous concern throughout life’,64 an ethical subject would thereby be 
composed whose actions, through practices of freedom and of truth-telling, are not enslaved 
by appetites, and whose ethos of care becomes extended through the conduct of relationships 
with others, including life (bios) itself. Care of the self is again affirmed as the opposite of an 
atomising philosophy or set of practices. Instead, care of the self ‘is an attitude towards the 
self, others, and the world’ comprising ‘a certain form of attention’ that will ‘produce or 
induce behavior through which one will actually be able to care for others’.65 This 
understanding is clarified in the following statements: ‘[t]he practice of the self links up with 
social practice or, if you like, the formation of a relationship of the self to the self quite clearly 
connects up with the relationship of the self to the other … [to constitute social relationships 
that] involve soul service as a dimension’;66 and ‘[g]iving an account of oneself [ultimately 
also leads] to bios, to life, to existence and the way in which one conducts this existence’.67 
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The congruence of one’s mode of existence with one’s (care of the) self thereby engenders an 
additional congruence with the care of life (bios) more broadly.68 In Foucault’s analysis, then, 
gnōthi seauton – ‘know thyself’ – ‘is valid both for the discovery of the soul and for bringing 
the problem of the bios to light’, although different self-knowledges may arise depending on 
which form (of psūkhe / metaphysics and bios) the enquiry of gnōthi seauton is indexically 
linked to.69 Whilst both ‘the discovery of the soul’ and the ‘problem of bios’ work towards an 
‘aesthetics of existence’,70 it is the latter – namely ‘bringing the problem of bios to light’ – 
that approaches and constitutes existence (bios) specifically ‘as an aesthetic object, as an 
object of aesthetic elaboration and perception’: or ‘bios as a beautiful work’.71 In this 
dimension of gnōthi seauton, then, ‘a metaphysics of the soul’ and ‘an aesthetics of life’ 
become congruent72 in a ‘stylistics of existence’ that affirms ‘life as possible beauty’.73 
 
For Socrates and especially the Cynics,74 a life of possible beauty was also a philosophical 
life that cared for ‘reason, truth and the constant improvement of your soul’.75 Importantly, 
such a life was in contradistinction with one in which all one’s ‘care’ was devoted to ‘wealth, 
reputation and honors’.76 Indeed, a lack of care of the self was understood to lead to an excess 
of ‘the legitimate exercise of one’s power’ and an imposition of ‘one’s fantasies, appetites, 
and desires on others’: as exhibited by ‘the rich and powerful man who uses his wealth and 
power to abuse others, to impose an unwarranted power on them’.77 Such a man is in fact ‘the 
slave of his appetites’, unable to regulate his power over others.78 Later, Aristotle similarly 
proposed a moral opposition between the chrematistic wealth associated with money-making 
and the natural or householding economy (oikos), claiming the former to be intrinsically 
destructive of the latter’s ‘reciprocal interplay of natural forces that are responsible for 
production and growth’.79  
 
For Socrates, then, ‘the greatest service’ he could perform was to try to persuade the wealthy 
Athenian élite ‘to care less about his property than about himself so as to make himself as 
excellent and reasonable as possible, to consider less the things of the city than the city itself, 
in short to apply these same principles to everything’.80 The neoliberal rational actor today is 
instead encouraged to manifest ‘her/his own self-interest through enterprise and competition 
for maximum profit’,81 a tendency contributing to the extreme plutonomic and kleptocratic 
concentrations of material and financial wealth characterising the contemporary moment.82 
The individualistic self bolstered by material accumulation and narcissistic attention to 
appearances83 is thereby in direct tension with a care of the self oriented towards sustaining 
the truth of justice and injustice known by the soul (on which more below), combined with 
clarity of intention and service towards other souls. In this respect, it is paradoxical that a 
great deal of conservation effort has become aligned with creating neoliberal incentive 
structures through which individual ‘green’ action is stimulated through the promise of 
financial profit.84 
 
Foucault himself often invokes a revolutionary mode of existence as both ‘a political project’ 
and ‘a form of life’.85 In his final lecture series Foucault dwells extensively on the 
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‘philosophical life’ exhibited through antagonistic renunciations of material wealth and 
attachment. Embodied in numerous ways by the Cynics, Stoics and Epicureans,86 Foucault 
sees these practices as revived especially from the 19th century onwards in what he terms 
‘revolutionary subjectivities’.87 As ‘a mode of living’ rather than an ‘individualistic resort’, 
the care of the self thus appears as ‘an intensification of social relations’88 extending an ethos 
of care through the conduct of relationships with others, including life (bios) itself. What I 
want to suggest, then, is that care of the self, in the terms recovered and elaborated by 
Foucault, may simultaneously ‘repotentialise the world’89 through an intensification of eco-
social relations and eco-ethical practices of care. Eco-social intensifications associated with 
care of self and others are also resonant with animistic ontologies, relationalities and arts of 
conduct.90 It is to these arts that I turn in the following section.  
 
 
Animist and affective activations of soul 
 
In order to know other cultures – non-western cultures, so-called primitive cultures 
… – in order to know these cultures we must no doubt have had not only to 
marginalize them, not only to look down upon them, but also to exploit them, to 
conquer them and in some way through violence to keep them silent. … So, if you 
will, my hypothesis is this: the universality of our knowledge has been acquired at 
the cost of exclusions, bans, denials, rejections, at the price of a kind of cruelty with 
regard to reality … 91 
 
In Foucault’s schema of power, the exercise of strategic power relations between individuals 
becomes extended through techniques of government into distinct governmentalities. These 
can become states of domination when a regime’s truth-games of the subject favour mastery 
over others rather than self-mastery. Nonetheless, and as articulated above, there is already 
divergence in the classical world regarding what should really be a focus of this care of the 
self that also constitutes a care of the soul, affirming that metaphysical frameworks can give 
rise to different regimes of truth and modes of existence that may become antagonistic.92 It is 
an individual’s soul – psūkhe – that is capable of ‘ethical differentiation’93, yet from Plato 
onwards a divergence also appears in what becomes the focus of care of the self through its 
contemplation by the soul.94 As delineated above, one important thread is a chain of 
connection between caring for others and for bios – life itself – and caring for one’s soul 
through care of the self. This thread of connection gives rise to a Foucaultian expression of 
‘biopower’ as the exercise of power in the interest of nurturing and sustaining ‘life’.95  
 
At the same time, these delineations are unclear on the nature of this ‘life itself’. In response, I 
wish to affirm two possible sets of correspondences. First, is a metaphysics of the soul that 
entwines ancient conceptualisations of eudaimonia  (harmonious soul) involving an ontology 
of the soul as constituting the divine within able to recognise itself, with an older 
understanding of soul as simultaneously animating the spirited agencies of nature, and whose 
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nourishment made it possible for those beings to also live well. As mentioned above, ‘soul’ in 
this metaphysics becomes something like a possible perceptual hypostasis of existence,96 
inviting co-participation and reciprocal care by human selves. Second, is an understanding of 
biopower as the exercise of power so as to nurture and sustain ‘life’ itself. Following these 
conceptualisations and correspondences towards a new ‘art of government’97 or ‘conduct of 
conduct’, the question then becomes – might it be possible to conceive and constitute 
something like an ‘animist biopower’ through which animist ontologies of being combine 
with ethical capacities for ‘living intimately with other souls’98 in the nurturing and 
sustenance of life itself?  
 
I have suggested elsewhere99 that political (re)activations of the power-full ‘anti-power’ of 
animist arts of conduct, asceticism, aesthetics and co-participation might offer critical forms 
of erasure of the simultaneously excessive and deadening limitations and exploitations of 
capitalist ‘world ecology’.100 Humans everywhere clearly are dependent through pragmatic 
predations on the ecology of selves amongst which we live. Animist ontologies, however, 
tend to extend radically beyond these pragmatic relationships into relational dimensions 
beyond-the-human that encourage care (epimeleia) as a field of practices towards self, others 
and souls. Affect, as in the mobilisation of feeling and emotion, is critical to this care. In so-
called animist contexts practices of care thus frequently deploy what Jerome Lewis101 refers 
to as ‘technologies of enchantment’ affirming relationships between human and varied 
beyond-human others as simultaneously affective, aesthetic and moral relationships requiring 
various forms of care.102  
 
These skills, liberated through transforming exercises of the self on the self103 with the 
support of varied human and beyond-human others, encourage the ‘significance of human 
interventions’ in a perceptual context of a communicative more-than-human world asserting 
multiple kinds of agency.104 Socioecologies thereby are perceived as ‘mutually constituted 
through processes of active, participative and affective relationships with landscapes and non-
human species’.105 Specifically, through making and experiencing intricate and intimate 
‘technologies’ of song, music, rhythm, dance, stories and costume an array of connecting and 
caring affects may be stimulated with ‘power-effects’ in terms of strategies of engagement 
with the multifaceted embodiments of life itself. These affects include aesthetic appreciation, 
senses of delight, wonder and mystery, perceptual opening to the presence and forms of spirit-
beings, and varied potent experiences of challenge, joy and trickery in connection with 
entities beyond-the-self.106  
 
To provide an example, separately enacted songs-dances that are part of a diverse, dynamic 
and strictly organised Ju|’hoan musical heritage repertoire in north-east Namibia are 
connected with a diversity of specific and polysemous potent entities encountered and 
variously consumed in San everyday and symbolic life.107 These highly technical musical 
sets, distinguished through rhythmic arrangements clapped by women, constitute ‘songs 
invested with supernatural energy’ (n|om tzísì).108 N|om tzísì songs connect with and evoke a 
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diversity of ‘beyond-human’ entities and their culturally-inflected associations: ‘elephant’, 
‘giraffe’, ‘honey’, ‘wind’, ‘hyena’, ‘oryx’, ‘rain’, ‘porcupine’, ‘eland’, ‘water’, ‘kudu’, 
‘wildebeest’, ‘buffalo’, ‘duiker’, ‘aardvark’, ‘springhare’, ‘scorpion’, ‘mamba’, ‘python’, 
‘puffadder’, ‘g|úí bird’, ‘giant eagle owl’, ‘grass’, ‘python’, ‘lion’, ‘g!ú!óbo snake’, ‘g||àqrà 
plant’, ‘mangetti tree’, ‘spider’, ‘stone chat’, ‘tortoise’, ‘buffalo’, ‘duiker’ and ‘mouse’, to 
name some of these lively entities.109  
 
These song-dances and the healing possibilities they effect are infused with cultural 
imaginaries and experiential affects that connect people, diversely embodied natural and 
supernatural entities, ancestors/spirits of the dead, and primal time sensitivities – the latter 
emphasising cultural memories of a time when humans and animals had not been separated 
by language.110 In ‘giraffe songs’, for example, the essence of ‘giraffe’ is invoked since this 
animal ‘is considered to possess the most powerful supernatural energy, with the help of 
which shamans may go the most easily into a trance and exercise their healing power 
effectively’.111 In other contexts a healer may affectively become a lion or other animal so as 
to travel more quickly beyond the physical body to the home of the great God where ‘the 
souls of the sick’ may be rescued.112 ‘Healing’ or curing in the context of San and Khoe 
medicine dances is enabled by combinations of complex and driving polyphonic vocal and 
clapped rhythms and rhythmic dancing, embedded within ritualised knowledges, practices 
and values regarding entities, hunting, gender, and significant life history transitions, all of 
which require stringent and sometimes fearful technologies of the self in correspondence with 
human and beyond-human others.113 In combination, these actions and associations enable 
affective intensities114 that move both individual healers and the participating community into 
transformed states of perceptual awareness and attention that permit the application of 
techniques needed for healing to occur.  
 
Anthropologist Jerome Lewis similarly describes the effects and affects of an array of ‘spirit-
plays’ performed by the spectrum of BaYaka peoples who for millennia have inhabited the 
forested areas of central and west Africa:  
 
Each spirit-play contributes to an economy of joy – a system of distributing practices 
and knowledge that ensure particular euphoric states are repeatedly produced and 
available to all present. … Each spirit-play has its own characteristic style that creates a 
different quality of joyful experience. During the total darkness of no-moon Malobe, for 
instance, fires are put out and torches forbidden, participants huddle together in the 
middle of camp with their legs resting on their neighbours’, and their voices intertwine 
in a complex polyphony until tiny luminous dots float into camp producing a calm, 
wondrous and expansive joy. In the pitch black participants melt into one another and 
the forest.115  
 
These varied BaYaka rituals ‘seduce non-physical entities (spirits) from the forest in order to 
establish something non-physical (spirit) in the sense of an uplifting or joyful atmosphere’ 
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that ‘people, animals and the forest will feel’.116 Skill and intention is deployed so as ‘to 
enchant many senses’, ‘using strange sounds, stirring sights, beautiful songs and dance 
movements, humour and parody, touch and smell, emotions and desires, … trance and 
overlapping percussive rhythms’.117 Through building enthusiasm amongst participants, ‘the 
music takes on a life of its own’ so as to reach ‘astounding synchronicity’ between singers, 
engendering euphoric experiences of connections between people, spirits and forest.118 On a 
different continent entirely, Amazonian shamans deploy the singing of delicate spirit-songs 
known widely as icaros that are taught to healers especially by plant spirits. In conjunction 
with potent psychoactive plant technologies, icaros are sung so as to attain a focused 
perceptual openness in which forest spirit-beings can be seen, communicated with and 
sometimes contested, and sicknesses can be seen and healed.119  
 
The exuberantly directed arts of enchantment, potency and healing described above seem less 
like ‘care-work’ or ‘affective labor’120 than perhaps arising through an immanent concern of 
‘the self’ to become pragmatically and aesthetically resonant with what is already musical – 
or harmonious – in nature.121 Foucault himself alludes directly to such resonance in 
meditating on the possibility of connections between the Greek roots of mel (care, cf. 
epimeleia) and melos (melody, song, rhythmic singing, music): thus ‘[t]here would be 
something like a musical secret, a secret of the musical appeal in this notion of care’.122 
Indeed, the possibility of individuals acting ‘musically’ together in the dance of multispecies 
socioecologies inspires Anthropologist Anna Tsing to assert that ‘we should be studying 
polyphonic assemblages, gatherings of ways of being’ in salvaging life from capitalist 
ruins.123 
 
All these care-full technologies of potency can only be enacted through rigorous technical 
training and skill in arts of the ‘the self’. By enabling experiential practices of joy, 
enchantment and participation in connection with the agencies of beyond-human souls, these 
skills and techniques act to entwine human being, desire and imagination with the interests of 
an ecology of selves-beyond-the-human so as to ensure the continuity and sustenance of all. 
Ecological relations thus indeed are enacted as multifaceted social relations, through which 
the objectification and instrumentalisation of other-than-human entities is attenuated.124 As 
Singh affirms, such affects and associated practices may assist with ‘framing conservation’ 
less ‘as a burdensome activity that entails sacrifice and costs alone’, so as to foster attention 
‘to the joyful and life-affirming aspects of conservation care labor and its transformative 
potential’.125 Egalitarian socioecological relations may be additionally nourished through 
constraining both material accumulation and consolidations of political authority and 
domination.126 
 
The cultures of practice and decentralised acts of government gestured towards above are 
associated with landscapes of great conservation value for the biodiversity that remains in the 
company of the pragmatically animist cultures that have lived there. It is the modernity of 
particularly the post-Cartesian moment that rejects these poetic ‘technologies of enchantment’ 
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and the soul though its cruelty towards foreign realities that can only become known once 
excluded, contained, suppressed, exploited, observed and exoticised.127 As Foucault notes in 
the quote that opens this section, ‘the west’ and its universality is asserted precisely through 
cruelty to the affective and ontological conceptions and practices of variously non-capitalist 
cultures that act as checks on human instrumentalisations of beyond-human natures. 
 
It may seem a far stretch to invoke these other(ed) cultures and arts of conduct in a 
Foucaultian meditation on ancient western technologies of the care of the self and of bios, i.e. 
life itself. But how far is it really? The ancient world of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle invoked 
by Foucault was also a pagan one shaped by the actions of a pantheon of gods and goddesses 
in communicative relationships with mortals.128 Dreams connected the self with worlds 
beyond the self, and required interpretation as part of care of the self,129 as is integral to self-
other care in many cultural contexts. Indeed, the last words of Socrates himself were 
reportedly an exhortation to his followers not to neglect an appropriate sacrifice to the god 
Asclepius who cures humans. This request is interpreted by Foucault in two relevant ways.130 
First, as an encouragement not to forget to care for the gods whose inescapable benevolence 
holds us in their care. In an interesting echo of an anthropology of ‘original affluence’ and an 
assumption of abundance that mitigates against accumulation,131 Socrates’ last words in 
Foucault’s interpretation are thus an exhortation to his followers not to forget that we exist in 
a metaphysical state of being cared for. Secondly, Foucault interprets Socrates’ last words as 
an encouragement to his followers to remember to give thanks for the cure of staying true to 
the soul’s sense of good and bad, rather than to be swayed and corrupted by the opinion of 
others.  
 
For Socrates, the part of us that knows one’s truth is once again the soul: the part that is in 
tune with justice and injustice, good and bad.132 It is in following this truth that ‘we will avoid 
that ruin/destruction of the soul caused by [following] the opinion of the crowd’.133 Here then, 
Foucault, via a meditation on Socrates’ last words, speaks of the courage to stay close to the 
truth known through the soul. Living ethically, including ‘eco-ethically’, thereby requires the 
courage of truth.  
 
 
Truth-telling as an (eco)ethical mode of existence supporting life lived by lives 
 
In his final lecture series, Foucault focused on the courage required so as to speak one’s truth 
truthfully, knowing there may be a risk associated with doing this: what the ancient Greeks 
called parrhēsia in contradistinction to the manipulations of one’s audience valued in 
rhetorical skill.134 Aristotle links ‘greatness of soul’ with the courage required by the practice 
of open-hearted parrhēsia – speaking one’s truth truthfully – even when this speaking may 
carry the risk of alienating one’s interlocuters, perhaps precipitating violent reactions to this 
truth.135 In speaking of the courage of Socrates’ truth-telling (parrhēsia) in the face of his 
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own death, Foucault indelibly entwines truth-telling with mode of life and practices of 
existence (as described above). Following Socrates he asserts, for example, that:  
 
[t]he mode of life appears as the essential, fundamental correlative of the practice of 
truth-telling. Telling the truth in the realm of the care of men [sic?] is to question 
their mode of life, to put this mode to the test and define what there is in it that may 
be ratified and recognized as good and what on the other hand must be rejected and 
condemned. In this you can see the fundamental series linking care, parrhēsia (free-
spokenness), and the ethical division between good and evil in the realm of bios 
(existence).136 
 
This ethical mode of veridiction and of truth-telling137 is, then, an inescapably ‘ethical 
parrhēsia’, ‘[i]ts privileged essential object [being] life and the mode of life’.138 For Socrates, 
whose mission was parrhēsia (telling one’s truth truthfully and with courage in the face of 
risk), ‘[i]f we can have phronēsis [reason] and take good decisions, this is because we have a 
particular relation to the truth which is founded ontologically in the nature of the soul’.139 It is 
the nature of the soul to disaggregate justice and injustice, good and bad, and Socrates’ aim is:  
 
to see to it that people take care of themselves, that each individual attends to 
himself [as] a rational being having a relation to truth founded on the very being of 
his soul. And in this we now have a parrhēsia on the axis of ethics. What is at 
stake in this new form of parrhēsia is the foundation of ethos as the principle on 
the basis of which conduct can be defined as rational conduct in accordance with 
the very being of the soul.140 
 
Foucaultian ethics, then, foundationally connects care, life / bios, truth, conduct, courage and 
the soul, to ask ‘[w]hat is the ethical relationship between courage and truth? Or, to what 
extent do the ethics of truth entail courage?’ And further, what are ‘the moral conditions 
which enable a subject to have access to the truth and to speak the truth’.141  
 
The contemporary moment, characterised as it is by both extreme inequality and extreme loss 
of life’s diversity, presents seemingly insurmountable ethical problems. But one thing seems 
clear. This is that parrhēsia – the courage to speak truth (to power) in the course of enacting 
caring practices of existence – is inescapable if one cares for the sustenance of continued 
human and beyond-human diversity. It is thereby a moment that seems to call for:  
 
militancy as bearing witness by one’s life in the form of a style of existence … 
ensuring that one’s life bears witness, breaks, and has to break with the 
conventions, habits, and values of society [through manifesting] directly, by its 
visible form, its constant practice, and its immediate existence, the concrete 
possibility and the evident value of an other life, which is the true life.142  
The unbearable weight of the Anthropocene makes it urgent for this radically other future life 
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– this life ‘that doesn’t yet exist and about which we cannot know how and what it will be’143 
– to be one that amplifies possibilities for structural resonance and mutuality between social, 
(in)organic and spirited diversities of existence. The problem and encouragement here, then, 
is to better play and refract the games of truth infusing practices of domination in socio-
environmental relations so as to amplify care for both human and beyond-human others.144 
For Foucault, playing the games of truth and the games of power with which these are 
imbricated with as little domination as possible required a care of the self as an ethos of 
freedom that simultaneously limits the concentration of power.145 The extension I am 
suggesting here is that animist socialist practices and perceptions of the soul and of life itself 
might energise a ‘post-conservationist’ ‘truth environmentality’146 that engenders practices of 
existence that are simultaneously less dominating and more affirming of life’s diversity. A 
multiciplicity of illustrations from past and present non-capitalist realities are of critical value 
in puncturing ‘the distortions of humanity that are wrought normal by the objective 
pretensions of the present’.147 In doing so, these contexts offer post-capitalist ‘counter-truths’ 
towards possible, if necessarily different, structural mutualities. 
 
Foucault contributed his final lecture series on The Courage of Truth in the knowledge that 
his corporeal time on earth was limited. From someone well travelled in appetites and 
capacities for embodied and affective intensities that take one beyond the docile, limited 
self,148 it seems pertinent and poignant that his final works, like Socrates’, were infused with 
encouragements to live a truthful philosophical life characterised by a mastery of appetites 
and a care of the self. This essay extends Foucault’s expositions on ‘the care of the self’ and 
‘the courage of truth’ as counter-propositions to the incentivised and atomised neoliberal 
agent. The suggestion is that care of the self can be understood and mobilised as a re-
connecting series of affective, ethical and aesthetic praxes that respond to and refract the 
multiple disconnections encouraged in the Cartesian moment and its privileging of the 
autonomous knowing subject.149 Becoming, thereby, a refraction of the narcissistic neoliberal 
and plutonomic ‘truths’ that eat into our souls to amplify domination and unfreedom.  
 
We are of course a long way indeed from an ‘animist socialist’ conduct of conduct as a 
liberatory refraction of the modes of subjectification associated with neoliberal 
governmentality. But in a political moment when white supremicism, plutonomy, kleptocracy 
and misogyny are (once again) shameless in their dominations of others, and when 
environmental regulation is framed simply as a constraint to economic growth and 
profiteering, imagining and articulating different possibilities seems more urgent than ever to 
counter-balance the destructive ‘truths’ legitimising current trajectories. For many of us 
concerned with the sustenance of both biological and cultural diversity, this then is perhaps 
the moment of our lives when we most need the courage to activate, and enact, a different sort 
of truth.  
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